

APPLICATION FOR UNITED STATES LETTERS PATENT

FOR

**Method And Apparatus  
For Generating Pseudo Random Numbers  
In A Video Device Having An Embedded Cipher Unit**

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**Method And Apparatus For Generating Pseudo Random Numbers In A Video  
Device Having An Embedded Cipher Unit**

**Related Application**

5           This application is a continuation-in-part application to U.S. Patent Applications number 09/385,590 and 09/385,592, both entitled Digital Video Content Transmission Ciphering and Deciphering Method and Apparatus, filed on August 29, 1999.

10   **BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION**

1.   **Field of the Invention**

          The present invention relates to the field of content protection. More specifically, the present invention addresses the generation of pseudo random  
15   numbers for use in a symmetric ciphering/deciphering process based authentication process for authenticating video receiving devices.

2.   **Background Information**

          In general, entertainment, education, art, and so forth (hereinafter collectively  
20   referred to as "content") packaged in digital form offer higher audio and video quality than their analog counterparts. However, content producers, especially those in the entertainment industry, are still reluctant in totally embracing the digital form. The primary reason being digital contents are particularly vulnerable to pirating. As unlike the analog form, where some amount of quality degradation generally occurs  
25   with each copying, a pirated copy of digital content is virtually as good as the "gold master". As a result, much effort have been spent by the industry in developing and

adopting techniques to provide protection to the distribution and rendering of digital content.

Historically, the communication interface between a video source device (such as a personal computer) and a video sink device (such as a monitor) is an analog interface. Thus, very little focus has been given to providing protection for the transmission between the source and sink devices. With advances in integrated circuit and other related technologies, a new type of digital interface between video source and sink devices is emerging. The availability of this type of new digital interface presents yet another new challenge to protecting digital video content.

While in general, there is a large body of cipher technology known, the operating characteristics such as the volume of the data, its streaming nature, the bit rate and so forth, as well as the location of intelligence, typically in the source device and not the sink device, present a unique set of challenges, requiring a new and novel solution. Parent applications number 09/385,590 and 09/385,592 disclosed various protocol and cipher/deciphering techniques to authenticate a video sink device and protect transmission to the video sink device. *Pseudo random numbers are employed as seed or basis numbers for the ciphering/deciphering process. Further, the video devices include embedded cipher units for performing the necessary ciphering and deciphering. The present invention addresses a novel approach to generate the required pseudo random numbers using the embedded cipher units, thereby eliminating the need to provide separate circuitry to generate the required pseudo random numbers.*

## BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF DRAWINGS

The present invention will be described by way of exemplary embodiments, but not limitations, illustrated in the accompanying drawings in which like references  
5 denote similar elements, and in which:

**Figure 1** illustrates an example video source device incorporated with the teachings of the present invention, in accordance with one embodiment;

**Figure 2** illustrates an overview of the authentication process employed by video source and sink devices of **Fig. 1** to authenticate video sink device to video  
10 source device, in accordance with one embodiment;

**Figure 3** illustrates the operational flow of the state machine of the authentication unit of **Fig. 1** to use the same cipher unit to generate pseudo random numbers; and

**Figures 4a-4c** illustrate a one way function suitable for use by the cipher unit  
15 of **Fig. 1** to practice the symmetric ciphering/deciphering process employed in one embodiment of the processes illustrated in **Fig. 3a-3b** in further detail, in accordance with one embodiment.

## DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION

In the following description, various aspects of the present invention will be described, and various details will be set forth in order to provide a thorough understanding of the present invention. However, it will be apparent to those skilled in the art that the present invention may be practiced with only some or all aspects of the present invention, and the present invention may be practiced without the specific details. In other instances, well known features are omitted or simplified in order not to obscure the present invention.

Various operations will be described as multiple discrete steps performed in turn in a manner that is most helpful in understanding the present invention. However, the order of description should not be construed as to imply that these operations are necessarily performed in the order they are presented, or even order dependent. Lastly, repeated usage of the phrase "in one embodiment" does not necessarily refer to the same embodiment, although it may.

Referring now to **Figure 1**, wherein a block diagram illustrating an example video source device incorporated with the teachings of the present invention, in accordance with one embodiment, is shown. As illustrated, video source device **102**, incorporated with the teachings of the present invention, and video sink device **104** are coupled to each other via digital video link **106**. Video source device **102** includes authentication unit **108** and video hardware interface **110**, sharing cipher unit **112**. Video source device **102**, using authentication unit **108**, authenticates video sink device **104**. Authentication unit **108** employs an authentication process that is based on a symmetric ciphering/deciphering process, requiring a seed or basis value to be provided by authentication unit **108**. The seed or basis value is a

pseudo random number. Upon authenticating video sink device **104**, video source device **102** generates and provides video content to video sink device **104** through video hardware interface **110**, which ciphers video content before transmission to protect the video content from unauthorized copying. Video hardware interface **110** ciphers the video content using ciphering bits generated by cipher unit **112**. In accordance with the present invention, authentication unit **108** also advantageously uses cipher unit **112** to generate the required pseudo random numbers, and cipher unit **112** include in particular a "one way function" in support of the symmetric ciphering/deciphering process. As a result, separate circuitry for generating the required pseudo random numbers need not be provided to authentication unit **108**, nor any other components of video source device **102**.

Except for the teachings of the present invention incorporated, to be described more fully below, video source device **102** is intended to represent a broad range of digital devices known in the art, including but not limited to computers of all sizes (from palm size device to desktop device, and beyond), set-up boxes, or DVD players. Examples of video sink devices include but are not limited to CRT monitors, flat panel displays, television sets and the like. As to digital video link **106**, it may be implemented in any one of a number of mechanical and electrical forms, as long as they are consistent with the operating requirement (i.e. speed, bit rate and so forth), and a mechanism (which may be in hardware or through protocol) is provided to allow control information to be exchanged between video source and sink devices **102** and **104**.

Before proceeding to describe the present invention in further detail, it should be noted that video sink device **104** may also be a video signal repeater device repeating signals for a "remotely" disposed video sink device. Based on the description to follow, it be appreciated that the present invention may nevertheless

be practiced regardless whether the authentication partner is a video sink device or merely a video repeater device. Accordingly, at times, in the description to follow, video sink device **104** may simply be referred to as a video receiving device.

**Figure 2** illustrates an overview of a symmetric ciphering/deciphering process based authentication process for authenticating a video receiving device, in accordance with one embodiment. For the illustrated embodiment, a video receiving device is also similarly equipped with an authentication unit and a cipher unit, as video source device **102**. Further, both video source device **102** and a video receiving device are assumed to be equipped with an array of private “cryptographic” device key ( $Ak_{sv}$  or  $Bk_{sv}$ ) by a certification authority (hereinafter, simply device keys). In one embodiment, the assignment of these private “cryptographic” device keys are performed in accordance with the teachings of the co-pending U.S. Patent Application number 09/275,722, filed on March 24, 1999, entitled Method and Apparatus for the Generation of Cryptographic Keys, having common assignee with the present application.

As shown, upon start up, such as power on or reset, authentication unit **108** of video source device **102** kicks off the authentication process by generating a basis value ( $A_n$ ) to the symmetric ciphering/deciphering process, selecting one of its device keys ( $Ak_{sv}$ ), and providing both of the values ( $A_n$ ,  $Ak_{sv}$ ) to the video receiving device. As alluded to earlier, basis value  $A_n$  is a pseudo random number, and it is advantageously generated using cipher unit **112**, to be described more fully below. In one embodiment, authentication unit **108** includes a state machine (not shown) having a number of operating states to control and uses cipher unit **112** to generate the required pseudo random numbers.

In response to the provision of  $(A_n, Ak_{sv})$  by video source device **102**, the authentication unit of the video receiving device responds by providing a selected one of its device keys  $(Bk_{sv})$ .

Thereafter, each of the authentication units of video source and receiving devices independently generates a verification value  $R_0$  and  $R_0'$ , using the basis value  $A_n$ , and the exchanged device keys  $Ak_{sv}$  and  $Bk_{sv}$ . The authentication unit of the video receiving device provides its independently generated verification value  $R_0'$  to the authentication unit **108** of video source device **102**. Authentication unit **102** in turn compares the two verification values, and depending on whether the two verification values successfully compares, uses the provided  $Bk_{sv}$  to determine if the video receiving device is an authorized device or a device to be trusted.

Authentication unit **108** of video source device **102** accepts  $Bk_{sv}$  and uses it to compare against an authorization list to determine whether the video receiving device is an authorized or trustworthy device if  $R_0$  equals  $R_0'$ , otherwise, if  $R_0$  not equals  $R_0'$ , the video receiving device is deemed to be an unauthorized or untrustworthy device, and no video transmission will be provided to the failed video receiving device.

For the illustrated embodiment, each of the authentication units of the video source and receiving devices independently generates the verification value  $R_0/R_0'$  by first generating an authentication key  $K_m/K_m'$ . As illustrated, authentication key  $K_m/K_m'$  is generated by summing  $Ak_{sv}$  over  $Bk_{sv}$  (see application number 09/275,722 for detail). Next, the authentication unit of the video source/receiving device independently generates the verification value  $R_0/R_0'$  using  $K_m/K_m'$  and  $A_n$ ). In one embodiment, the authentication unit generates  $R_0/R_0'$  employing a "one way function" with  $K_m/K_m'$  and  $A_n$ .



For the illustrated embodiment, each authentication unit also generates, as part of the process for generating  $R_0/R_0'$ , a shared secret  $M_0/M_0'$  and a session key  $K_s/K_s'$ . Shared secret  $M_0/M_0'$  and session key  $K_s/K_s'$  are used in the protection of the video transmitted post authentication. Employment of  $M_0/M_0'$  and  $K_s/K_s'$  to protect the video transmitted post authentication is the subject matters of the parent applications. See the respective applications for details.

*Figure 3 illustrates the operational states and transition rules of the state machine incorporated with the authentication unit of Fig. 1 to use the cipher unit to generate the required pseudo random, in accordance with one embodiment. As illustrated, the state machine has five operating states, E0 a continuous clocking state, E1 a first cipher bit taking state, E2 an output state, E3 a second cipher bit taking state E4, and E5 an active state (also referred to as the authenticated state).*

*The state machine enters state E0 upon power on. While in state E0, the state machine causes the cipher unit to be continuously clocked to incorporate entropy into the cipher unit. From state E0, the state machine transitions to the state E1, first cipher bit taking state, upon receipt of a request for a first pseudo random number, after clocking the cipher units for  $n$  clocks, where  $n$  is an integer. In state E1, the state machine causes a necessary number of the output ciphering bits of the cipher unit be taken and stored into a temporary storage location (not shown) for output. From state E1, the state machine enters the state E2, upon storing the taken ciphering bits. In state E1, the state machine causes the stored ciphering bits to be output as the requested pseudo random number.*

*From state E2, the state machine enters either state E3 or E4, or return to state E0. If the authentication process fails to authenticate the video receiving device that triggered the request for the pseudo random number, the state machine*

returns to state E0, the continuous clocking state. On the other hand, if the authentication process successfully authenticated the video receiving device, the state machine transitions to state E4, the active or authenticated state. While waiting for the result of the authentication process, if another authentication request  
5 for pseudo random number is requested (e.g. for authenticating yet another video receiving device), the state machine transitions to the state E3, the second cipher bit taking state.

At state E3, similar to state E1, the state machine causes a necessary number of the output ciphering bits of the cipher unit be taken and stored into a  
10 temporary storage location (not shown) for output. From state E3, the state machine transitions back to the state E2, upon storing the taken ciphering bits.

At state E4, the active or authenticated state, the cipher unit is used to generate ciphering bits to cipher the video before transmitting to a video receiving device. Accordingly, the cipher unit is not available for pseudo random number  
15 generation. From state E4, the state machine transitions back to E0, the continuous clocking state, if the authentication unit is notified of the video receiving device becoming "unauthorized" (for whatever reasons) or becoming detached from the video source device (i.e. no device attached). From state E4, the state machine also may transition to E3, the second cipher bit taking state, if another  
20 authentication request for a pseudo random number is received (e.g. to authenticate yet another video receiving device).

Accordingly, based on the inherent randomness of the cipher unit, as well as the stochastic characteristic of the authentication requests for pseudo random numbers, experience has shown that the numbers outputted in accordance with the  
25 taken ciphering bits as described, do possess reasonably well pseudo random characteristics for the authentication process.

**Figures 4a-4c** illustrate a one-way function suitable for use by the cipher unit of **Fig. 1** to practice the symmetric ciphering/deciphering process of **Fig. 3**, in accordance with one embodiment. As alluded to earlier, in one embodiment, this one-way function is a part of the authentication unit of each of the video source/receiving devices. As illustrated in **Fig. 4a**, the one way function **800** includes a number of linear feedback shift registers (LFSRs) **802** and combiner function **804**, coupled to each other as shown. LFSRs **802** and combiner function **804** are collectively initialized with the appropriate keys and data values. During operation, the values are successively shifted through LFSRs **802**. Selective outputs are taken from LFSRs **802**, and combiner function **804** is used to combine the selective outputs to generate the desired outputs.

In one embodiment, four LFSRs of different lengths are employed. Three sets of outputs are taken from the four LFSRs. The polynomials represented by the LFSR and the bit positions of the three sets of LFSR outputs are given by the table to follow:

LFSR	Polynomial	Combining Function Taps		
		0	1	2
3	$X^{17} + X^{15} + X^{11} + X^5 + 1$	5	11	16
2	$X^{16} + X^{15} + X^{12} + X^8 + X^7 + X^5 + 1$	5	9	15
1	$X^{14} + X^{11} + X^{10} + X^7 + X^6 + X^4 + 1$	4	8	13
0	$X^{13} + X^{11} + X^9 + X^5 + 1$	3	7	12

The initialization of the LFSRs and the combiner function, more specifically, the shuffling network of the combiner function, is in accordance with the following table.

	Bit Field	Initial Value
LFSR3	[16]	Complement of input bit 47
	[15:0]	Input bits[55:40]
LFSR2	[15]	Complement of input bit 32
	[14:0]	Input bits[39:25]
LFSR1	[13]	Complement of input bit 18
	[12:0]	Input bits[24:12]
LFSR0	[12]	Complement of input bit 6
	[11:0]	Input bits[11:0]
Shuffle	Register A	0
Network	Register B	1

5           The combined result is generated from the third set of LFSR outputs, using the first and second set of LFSR outputs as data and control inputs respectively to combiner function **804**. The third set of LFSR outputs are combined into a single bit.

10           **Fig. 4b** illustrates combiner function **804** in further detail, in accordance with one embodiment. As illustrated, combiner function **804** includes shuffle network **806** and XOR **808a-808b**, serially coupled to each other and LFSRs **802** as shown. For the illustrated embodiment, shuffle network **806** includes four binary shuffle units **810a-810d** serially coupled to each other, with first and last binary shuffle units **810a** and **810d** coupled to XOR **808a** and **808b** respectively. XOR **808a** takes the first  
15           group of LFSR outputs and combined them as a single bit input for shuffle network

806. Binary shuffle units **810a-810d** serially propagate and shuffle the output of XOR **808a**. The second group of LFSR outputs are used to control the shuffling at corresponding ones of binary shuffle units **810a-810d**. XOR **808b** combines the third set of LFSR outputs with the output of last binary shuffle unit **810d**.

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**Fig. 4c** illustrates one binary shuffle unit **810\*** (where \* is one of **a-d**) in further detail, in accordance with one embodiment. Each binary shuffle unit **810\*** includes two flip-flops **812a** and **812b**, and a number of selectors **814a-814c**, coupled to each other as shown. Flip-flops **812a** and **812b** are used to store two state values (A, B). Each selector **814a**, **814b** or **814c** receives a corresponding one of the second group of LFSR outputs as its control signal. Selector **814a-814b** also each receives the output of XOR **808a** or an immediately preceding binary shuffle unit **810\*** as input. Selector **814a-814b** are coupled to flip-flops **812a-812b** to output one of the two stored state values and to shuffle as well as modify the stored values in accordance with the state of the select signal. More specifically, for the illustrated embodiment, if the stored state values are (A, B), and the input and select values are (D, S), binary shuffle unit **810\*** outputs A, and stores (B, D) if the value of S is "0". Binary shuffle unit **810\*** outputs B, and stores (D, A) if the value of S is "1".

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Accordingly, a novel method and apparatus for generating pseudo random numbers in a video device having an embedded cipher unit has been described.

### Epilogue

From the foregoing description, those skilled in the art will recognize that many other variations of the present invention are possible. Thus, the present invention is not limited by the details described, instead, the present invention can

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be practiced with modifications and alterations within the spirit and scope of the appended claims.

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